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Abstract 
 This article argues that the category ‘pacification’ offers the critique of 
security a means of thinking through the connection between war, police and 
accumulation. Pacification is a process in which the war power is used in the 
fabrication of a social order of wage labour. This aligns the war power with the 
police power, and suggests that their interconnection might be understood 
through the lens of pacification. The article explores this through one of the 
mechanisms through which the war power and police power combine: the hunt. 
Capital rests on the hunt: the hunt for vagabonds, beggars, enemies, criminals, 
terrorists. Behind this hunt lies capital’s original demand, Let there be 
Accumulation! ‘Pacification’ is a category that helps us make sense of the way 
the state responds to this demand. 
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 In the chapter on the genesis of industrial capital in Volume 1 of Capital, Marx 
writes:  
 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement 
and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, 
the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of 
Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of black skins, are all 
things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. 
These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive 
accumulation. Hard on their heels follows the commercial war of the 
                                                 
1 Mark Neocleous is Professor of the Critique of Political Economy in the Department of Politics and 
History at Brunel University in the UK. He is the author of several books including, most recently, Critique 
of Security (2008), and co-editor (with George Rigakos) of Anti-security (2011). His new book, War Power, 
Police Power, is forthcoming in 2014. He is a member of the Editorial Collective of Radical Philosophy.  
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European nations, which has the globe as its battlefield … These different 
moments are systematically combined together at the end of the 
seventeenth century in England; the combination embraces the colonies, 
national debt, the modern tax system, and the system of protection. These 
methods depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system. 
But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized 
force of society, to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation 
of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten 
the transition. Violence is the midwife of every old society which is 
pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power (Marx, 1976, 915-
6). 
 
 Marx here highlights the fact that capitalism is not a spontaneous order and that, 
in contrast to the myth of an idyllic origin of private property, in actual history violence 
plays a central role. What is at stake in Marx’s discussion is the constitution of bourgeois 
order through what Marx calls ‘primitive accumulation’: the use of force and violence in 
separating people from a means of subsistence other than the wage. I want to suggest that 
the insight Marx here offers into the violence of accumulation is one that lies at the heart 
of the process of pacification.  
   In a previous essay trying to help map out the terrain of a project organised 
around the idea of anti-security (Neocleous, 2011a; also 2010), I argued that for tactical 
purposes critical theory really needs to re-appropriate the term ‘pacification’. The central 
argument was that we need to grasp security as pacification. I suggested that whereas for 
most people ‘pacification’ is associated with the actions of colonizing powers, has a close 
connection to counter-insurgency tactics and is therefore widely understood as the 
military crushing of resistance, an examination of the theory and practice of pacification 
reveals a far more ‘productive’ dimension to the idea. ‘Productive’ in that what is involved 
is less the military crushing of resistance and more the fabrication of order, of which the 
crushing of resistance is but one part. This is why the key theorists of pacification, from 
Machuca in the late-sixteenth century, through to General Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, 
General Galliéni, Lieutenant Colonel Lyautey in the nineteenth century, taking in Roger 
Trinquier and David Galula in the twentieth century, all talk about pacification as a war 
to build rather than destroy. It is also why the key practice of pacification is nothing less 
than a feat of enormous social engineering to (re)build a social order. And what is to be 
built in this new order is a secure foundation for accumulation.  
    This image of pacification aligns it with what has historically been understood as 
the police project – the fabrication of social order organised around the administration of 
wage labour – and connects very closely with the fact that the critique of security reads 
and treats security as a police mechanism (Neocleous, 2000; 2008; Neocleous and 
Rigakos, 2011). What this means, in turn, and especially so given the connections 
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between pacification and war, is that to employ the category ‘pacification’ critically we are 
compelled to connect the police power to the war power. Indeed, as a critical concept 
‘pacification’ insists on conjoining war and police in a way which is fundamentally 
opposed to the mainstream tendency that thinks of war and police as two separate 
activities institutionalized in two separate institutions (the military and the police). This 
ideological separation has had a debilitating effect on radical scholarship within the 
academy, since it has imposed on scholars a banal dichotomy of ‘models’, such as the 
‘criminological model’ versus the ‘military model’, and generated a set of what are 
ultimately liberal concerns, such as the ‘militarization of the police’ and the ‘policization 
of the military’ or the coming together of ‘high intensity policing’ with ‘low-intensity 
warfare’. Such models and concerns obscure the unity of state power and act as a blockage 
on radical thought.  
    In other words, if radical theory in general and the politics of anti-security in 
particular are to get any kind of purchase on pacification as an idea then we must address 
the ways in which it invokes the conjunction of war and police. As much as the art of war 
is the art of the polis – the polis originates as a guild of warriors, as Weber (1978, 1359) 
points out – so too the polis connotes police as well as city. ‘Pacification’ is intended to 
capture the way in which war and police are always already together, the way they operate 
conjointly under the sign of security, and the way in which this operation is entwined 
with the process of accumulation. In other words, ‘pacification’ is intended to grasp a 
nexus of ideas – war-police-accumulation – in the security of bourgeois order. All of 
which is to say that from the perspective of the critique of security, it is impossible to 
understand the history of bourgeois society without grasping it as a process of 
pacification in the name of security and accumulation. 
    Starting with Marx’s category of ‘primitive accumulation’, which I believe helps us 
understand the police power at the heart of class war, the intention in this article is to 
make ‘pacification’ a central category for our understanding of that war. To stress the 
‘active’ or ‘productive’ nature of pacification, the article places the manhunt at the heart 
of the process, seeking to posit the hunt for workers, for criminals, for terrorists, and for 
the enemies of order as integral to the most significant demand imposed on human 
beings in the last 500 years: let there be accumulation!  
 
Let There Be Workers!  
 
 Marx begins his analysis of primitive accumulation by claiming that it plays the 
same role in political economy as primitive sin does in theology. 
 
Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race. Its origin is 
supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote about the past. 
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Long, long ago there were two sorts of people: one, the diligent, intelligent 
and above all frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, 
and more, in riotous living… Thus it came to pass that the former sort 
accumulated wealth, and the latter sort finally had nothing to sell but their 
own skins. And from this primitive sin dates the poverty of the great 
majority who, despite all their labour, have up to now nothing to sell but 
themselves (Marx, 1976, 873). 
 
Marx’s ironic turn of phrase is designed to open up the important move he makes, one in 
which he shifts from mocking the concept as used by Smith to using it as a serious 
concept in its own right.  
    For Marx, primitive accumulation is the process that constitutes capitalist social 
relations as the separation of the bulk of the population from the means of production 
(Marx, 1973, 489). This process is of obvious crucial historical importance, since without 
separating workers from the means of production capital could not have come into being; 
without such separation there could be no capitalist accumulation. The secret of the 
expression of value lies in how capital manages labour, and that reveals in turn the 
fundamental secret of accumulation, namely ‘the appropriation of unpaid labour’. In 
other words, the underlying principle of accumulation is that capital must have at its 
disposal the unpaid labour of workers. Marx restates the key point time and again: 
capitalist accumulation has for its fundamental condition the expropriation of the worker 
(Marx, 1976, 152, 168, 672, 743, 748, 793, 613, 940).2 This is why capital constantly seeks 
to remove all means of subsistence other than the wage, why it always searches for ways 
to force down wages, and why it has to permanently discipline people into and in their 
role as productive and efficient workers.  
    One of the purposes of Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation is to show that 
in contrast to the story told in political economy, where accumulation is simply assumed 
to have emerged in peaceful and idyllic conditions, in actual history violence is integral to 
the process. This violence turns out to be central to the argument through the whole of 
Capital, but Marx addresses it at length in the chapter on ‘the genesis of industrial capital’ 
where, as we have observed, he connects the extirpation and enslavement of human 
beings during the conquest of the colonies to the wider commercial war of the European 
nations: the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system and the whole system of 
protection depend on the coercive power of the state to transform the feudal mode of 
production into the capitalist mode. Capital comes into the world ‘dripping from head to 
toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt’ (Marx, 1976, 926). Capital is fabricated, and it is 
fabricated through sheer force. Capital demands ‘Let there be workers!’ (Marx, 1973, 
                                                 
2  I have explored the importance of this in Neocleous, 2012, pp. 941-62, on which this section is based. 
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506n), and to this demand the state responds using every means of violence at its 
disposal. 
    Two points to note here about this mechanism by which people are made to work 
within the conditions posited by capital. The first is that it is a permanent feature of 
capitalism. This permanence is important, since it is easy to treat primitive accumulation 
as a concept applicable solely to the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism – a 
view encouraged by the fact that the discussion of primitive accumulation requires a 
discussion of historical enclosures and colonialism and the convention of translating 
‘ursprüngliche’ as ‘primitive’ rather than ‘original’ or ‘previous’ (‘ursprüngliche’ being 
Marx’s translation of Smith’s ‘previous’, which those translating Marx’s work into English 
rendered as ‘primitive’). In fact, we need to understand primitive accumulation as the 
foundation of capital not just historically but permanently: capital presupposes the 
divorce of workers from the conditions of the realization of their labour, and as soon as it 
is able to stand on its own two feet capital reproduces this divorce over and again. Hence 
Marx’s claim that ‘accumulation merely presents as a continuous process what in 
primitive accumulation appears as a distinct historical process’ (1972, 272, emphasis 
added). In other words, ‘primitive accumulation’ is not a term describing a period in the 
emergence of capitalist relations or a transitory phenomenon characteristic of the 
‘prehistory’ of capital but, rather, captures capitalism’s need to permanently form markets 
and re-create its own labour supply. If the separation of labourers from the conditions of 
labour independent of capital is (not just was) the social constitution of capitalist social 
relations, then we need to understand primitive accumulation not as a historical process 
exhausted by the consolidation of capital but, rather, a permanent feature of accumulation 
(Luxemburg, 1913; Balibar, 1970; Midnight Notes Collective, 1992, 318).  
    The second point to note about the process is that it is a form of war. Not ‘war’ in 
the classical military sense of organised inter-state violence, but, rather, a ‘social war’ or 
‘civil war’. In a speech at Elberfeld in 1845 Frederick Engels commented on ‘present-day 
society, which … produces a social war of all against all’ (Engels, 1975a, 248). This was a 
major theme of The Condition of the Working Class in England, published the same year, 
which describes ‘the social war, the war of each against all’. Everywhere is barbarous 
indifference, hard egotism and nameless misery: ‘every man’s house is a state of siege, 
everywhere reciprocal plundering under the protection of the law’, meaning that 
‘everywhere [is] social warfare’. Such comments appear as a gloss on the perpetual war of 
the state of nature as described by Hobbes, but Engels points to the class dimension of 
this war. ‘Let us proceed to a more detailed investigation of the position in which the 
social war has placed the non-possessing class’, an investigation which takes in the 
miserable condition of the working class, the deaths from overwork and malnutrition, 
and the use of the law against any attempt on the part of the working class to resist such 
conditions. ‘Is this social war, or is it not?’ asks Engels (Engels, 1975b, 329, 331, 554, 502, 
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512). Marx likewise refers to ‘civil war in its most terrible aspect, the war of labour against 
capital’ (1977, 147), and in Capital writes of the struggles over the working day as part of 
a ‘protracted and more or less concealed civil war between the capitalist class and the 
working class’ (Marx, 1976, 409, 412-3). As joint-authors of the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party Marx and Engels also write of the ‘more or less veiled civil war’ that 
takes place in bourgeois society with the development of the proletariat (Marx and 
Engels, 1984, 495). 
    It is too easy to say that when Marx and Engels use the term ‘war’ in these ways 
they do so in a rhetorical sense (Malesevic, 2010, 22) but, much as Marx and Engels do 
delight in more than the occasional rhetorical flourish, their claims about the social war 
are meant to be taken seriously. Hence when in Capital Marx comments that ‘force is the 
midwife of every old society which is pregnant with a new one’, and that force ‘is itself an 
economic power’ (1976, 916), the term Marx uses is Gewalt, better understood as 
‘violence’, and he is describing the process which underpinned the rise of capital and 
created the proletariat. The violence is a form of war.  
    What Marx is talking about when he is describing primitive accumulation, then, is 
class war. Now, as well as brute force, two of the main weapons used by the ruling class in 
this war are law and police: the Acts outlawing vagabondage, begging, wandering, and 
myriad other ‘offenses’ on the one hand, and the enclosure of the commons through the 
theft and transformation of the commons into private property on the other. This is the 
‘bloody legislation’ against the expropriated which transforms peasants into vagabonds 
and paupers and then transforms vagabonds and paupers into good workers, and is 
integral to Marx’s analysis of accumulation. Marx cites an Act passed under Henry VIII 
in 1530: ‘Beggars who are old and incapable of working receive a beggar’s licence’, but 
‘sturdy vagabonds’ are to be beaten and punished. ‘They are to be tied to the cart-tail and 
whipped until the blood streams from their bodies, that they are to swear on oath to go 
back to their birthplace or to where they have lived the last three years and to “put 
themselves to work”’. A later Statute under Henry VIII repeated and strengthened this 
with new clauses: ‘For the second [offense] for vagabondage the whipping is to be 
repeated and half the ear sliced off; but for the third relapse the offender is to be executed 
as a hardened criminal and enemy of the common weal’. A further Act of 1547 ordained 
that if anyone refuses to work ‘he shall be condemned as a slave to the person who has 
denounced him as an idler’. 
 
The master … has the right to force him to do any work, no matter how 
disgusting, with whip and chains. If the slave is absent a fortnight, he is 
condemned to slavery for life and is to be branded on forehead or back 
with the letter S; if he runs away thrice, he is to be executed as a felon. The 
master can sell him, bequeath him, let him out on hire as a slave, just as 
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any other personal chattel or cattle. If the slaves attempt anything against 
the masters, they are also to be executed. Justices of the peace, on 
information, are to hunt the rascals down. If it happens that a vagabond 
has been idling about for three days, he is to be taken to his birthplace, 
branded with a red-hot iron with the letter V on the breast and be set to 
work, in chains, in the streets or at some other labour. If the vagabond 
gives a false birthplace, he is then to become the slave for life of this place, 
of its inhabitants, or its corporation, and to be branded with an S. All 
persons have the right to take away the children of the vagabonds and keep 
them as apprentices, the young men until they are 24, the girls until they 
are 20. If they run away, they are to become, until they reach those ages, 
the slaves of their masters, who can put them in irons, whip them, etc. if 
they like … The last part of this statute provides, that certain poor people 
may be employed by a place or by persons who are willing to give them 
food and drink and to find them work. Slaves of the parish of this kind 
were still to be found in England in the mid nineteenth century under the 
name of ‘roundsmen’. 
 
Marx continues with an Act of 1572:  
 
Unlicensed beggars … age are to be severely flogged and branded on the 
left ear unless some one will take them into service for two years; in case of 
a repetition of the offence … they are to be executed, unless some one will 
take them into service for two years; but for the third offence they are to be 
executed without mercy as felons. 
 
Remaining with the English case, Marx goes on: 
 
James 1: Any one wandering about and begging is declared a rogue and a 
vagabond. Justices of the peace in Petty Sessions are authorised to have 
them publicly whipped and to imprison them for six months for the first 
offence, and two years for the second. Whilst in prison they are to be 
whipped as much and as often as the justices of the peace think fit… 
Incorrigible and dangerous rogues are to be branded with an R on the left 
shoulder and set to hard labour, and if they are caught begging again, to be 
executed without mercy. 
 
And on it goes through the development of the criminal law. Note that the creatures who 
would haunt the bourgeois mind at this point historically, the vagabonds, paupers, 
beggars, criminals, as well as their social cousins who will later emerge (the ‘undeserving 
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poor’, the ‘skivers’, the ‘squeegee merchants’, the ‘feral youth’, the ‘delinquents’), will be 
the ones on which war will be declared time and again, but are the subject of police power, 
by definition, for they are the enemies of order. Yet as we know, ‘police’ at this time was 
concerned not just with order in general, but referred to ‘a bundle of measures that made 
work possible and necessary to all those who could not possibly live without it’, as 
Foucault puts it in History of Madness (2006, 62; also Neocleous, 2000). This bundle of 
police measures in aid of war and war measures in aid of police to make work possible and 
necessary – that is, to put the poor to work, to make the working class work and thus, in 
effect, to make the working class – is the state’s response to the demand ‘Let there be 
Workers!’. It is nothing less than the secret of accumulation. Might this also be the secret 
of pacification? 
 
Let’s Go Hunting! 
 
 In the context of his discussion of police in History of Madness, Foucault describes 
the 1656 Edict which established the Hôpital Général. Pointing out that the institution 
was expected to ‘prevent begging and idleness, the sources of all disorder’, Foucault cites 
Paragraph 9 of the Edict, which forbade ‘all persons … to beg in the city and outskirts of 
Paris, or in the churches, at the doors of churches, at the doors of houses or in the streets, 
or anywhere else, publicly or in private, by day or by night … on pain of whipping for a 
first offence, and the galleys for men and boys upon a second offence’. The Edict was 
passed on 27 April, 1656, and Foucault notes that two weeks later the militia of the 
Hôpital Général ‘went out hunting for beggars for the first time, and brought them back 
to the different buildings of the Hospital’ (Foucault, 2006, 62-4). Foucault does not make 
much of this, yet it contains an important observation: the hunting for beggars. Elsewhere 
he describes the ‘great police sorting out process’ which began with ‘the hunting down of 
vagrants, beggars, the idle’ (Foucault, 1996, 83).3 We have also earlier cited Marx quoting 
the Act of 1547 to the effect that ‘Justices of the peace, on information, are to hunt the 
rascals down’ as well as his description of Africa as a preserve for the ‘hunting of black 
skins’. Through the lens of police (Foucault) and the lens of accumulation (Marx) we are 
alerted to nothing less than the world historical importance of the manhunt. 
    ‘Governments mounted special searches or manhunts for vagrants’, notes A. L. 
Beier in his history of vagrancy law. 
  
The Statute of Winchester (1285) had required regular round-ups of felons 
in towns, and there were frequent searches for vagrants in London from 
1514 and about the same time in some provincial towns. But national 
                                                 
3  He makes a similar observation in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977, 88), but again does not make a 
great deal of it. 
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campaigns were seemingly first instituted under the Tudors. The Vagrancy 
Act of 1495 ordered [searches and round-ups] in all the towns and villages 
of the realm, as did a proclamation of 1511 and another of 1530. The poor 
law of 1536 also commanded officials to conduct nightly and daily ‘privy 
or secret’ searches for ‘all rufflers, sturdy vagabonds and valiant beggars’, 
and a new Act in 1610 established regular swoops for the first time (1985, 
155). 
 
As Beier notes about England, and as others have noted about such hunts in other 
European cities (for example, see Geremek, 1994, 215), the logic was driven by the very 
fact of vagrancy itself, a protean concept to describe social disorder in all its 
manifestations: the status of ‘vagrancy’ was a criminal one merely because it was at odds 
with the established order, and this condition affected all those beggars, hawkers, 
travellers, peddlers, harlots, cutpurses, minstrels and other masterless men and women 
whose status and condition looked like vagrancy to the ruling class. As such, it was also 
decidedly political and thus the tensions surrounding it intensified during periods of 
unrest. Hence in England the periods of intense hunting for vagabonds of 1560-72 and 
1631-9 followed rebellions of a more direct political nature (Beier, 1985, xxii, 4, 152, 155-
6). In this regard, it is worth registering that the Old French term Meute referred to ‘the 
hunt’ but also connoted ‘rebellion or insurrection’ (Canetti, 1962, 97).  
    Such searches and roundups constituted the foundation of police power. Or, to 
put that another way, the police power was forged through the hunting of the idle poor, 
the beggar and the vagabond (Chamayou, 2012, 78). This hunting of beggars, vagabonds 
and the idle needs to be set in a wider context, one that alludes more directly to the police 
power in the making of the working class.  
    We have become accustomed to thinking in terms of strict categorizations of the 
historical forms of labour. These are usually ‘slave’, ‘serf’, ‘wage-labourer’, but often also 
understood as ‘free’ versus ‘coerced’. In fact, various forms and degrees of contractual 
(‘free’) and yet coerced (‘unfree’) labour existed as late as the late-nineteenth century, in 
western industrialized nations as well as the colonies. There are three points to be made 
in this regard. 
    First there is the fact that the distinction between servitude and slavery was never 
clear. When Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest is referred to as a ‘slave’ despite being 
a ‘servant’ the slippage is not accidental. Likewise, in the work of a key bourgeois thinker 
such as John Locke, one finds that the distinction between slave and servant is made yet 
keeps breaking down, with Locke sometimes using the second term to refer to the slave 
proper. He speaks of a Planter’s ‘Power in his Family over Servants, born in his House, 
and bought with his Money’ (Locke, 1988, 131). Blackstone in his Commentaries on 
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English Law insists that there is no room in English law for ‘absolute slavery’ yet allows 
for forms of compulsory labour which appear to be a kind of not-quite-absolute-slavery. 
    Second, this oscillation between slavery and servitude is also a reflection of the 
extent to which degrees of ‘quasi-slavery’ continued to exist, partly a remnant of 
villeinage, partly an outcome of the law failing to distinguish theoretically between a slave 
and a serf, and partly due to the various Vagrancy Acts which facilitated the idea of 
slavery as a form of punishment. The English Vagrancy Act of 1547, for example, one of 
the harshest of Tudor laws and cited by Marx to that effect, created the category of ‘slave’ 
as means of punishing the idle and recalcitrant poor. As we have seen, the definition of 
‘vagrancy’ was extended to cover any unemployed worker refusing to work for mere 
board, and anyone transgressing the provisions of the Act could become a slave for two 
years to the person informing on them. Those attempting to flee this punishment could 
be made slave for life. Parliament eventually repealed the law – not without a fight, since 
many still spoke of its advantages and continued to do so after its repeal – but the law 
itself is suggestive of the ways in which the categories of slave, servant, vagabond and 
worker were permeable.  
    Third, even when laws such as this were repealed, pockets of indentured labour 
remained. English law made the violation of many labour agreements punishable with 
imprisonment, and workers would be freed only after they had returned to their 
employers and completed the service in question. This service might last for a year, but 
would often be extended against the will of the worker as punishment for the original 
absence. This was transplanted into the colonial law of America, such that in both 
England and colonial America ‘contractual labor’ existed in varying degrees of 
‘unfreedom’ (Steinfeld, 1991; Steinfeld, 2001). Indeed, well into the nineteenth century, 
runaway apprentices were still legally being hunted. This whole process of indentured 
labour was managed by irregular payment of wages such that workers could not leave 
their jobs without forfeiting several weeks or months of pay, a process that in real terms 
can feel like slavery.4  
    These forms and degrees of coerced (‘unfree’) and yet contractual (‘free’) labour 
inform us that by targeting the ‘vagrant’ or ‘idle’ poor, the manhunt was also de facto 
targeting the emerging working class. Put another way: the class of ‘free’ wage labour was 
forged through the manhunt, which was thereafter central to the political administration 
of formally free but materially coerced labour. 
   In a parallel process, the hunt was also central to strategies of accumulation and 
domination in the colonies. I have written elsewhere about the centrality of Captain 
                                                 
4  This latter point explains why as late as 1957 an ‘Abolition of Forced Labour Convention’ needed to be 
passed by international human rights movements in order to ‘provide that wages shall be paid regularly and 
prohibit methods of payment which deprive the worker of a genuine possibility of terminating his 
employment’. The reason given was that such deprivation was ‘analogous to slavery’ (Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1957). 
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Bernardo de Vargas Machuca’s work on ‘Indian militia’ fighting and suggested that we 
might read it as perhaps the world’s first extended treatment of pacification. Machuca 
argues that the military colonization of the Americas requires a kind of political violence 
in which the methods of those being pacified are adopted by the pacifiers. Local 
knowledge of crops and animals is necessary, but more important is the fact that the 
Indians fight like hunters. In this light Machuca advocates skirmishing, ambushing and 
fighting on the move, essentially as a permanent ‘hunt’ against the enemy ‘hunters’. 
Through the adoption of ‘Indian militia’ ways of fighting, colonial warfare took the form 
of a continuous manhunt (Machuca, 2008; 2010; see Neocleous, 2011a). In so doing 
Machuca put his finger on a key aspect of the wars of colonial accumulation. More 
generally, the wars with the other ‘Indians’ found across the globe often took the form of 
manhunts intended to capture slaves for labour. Armed expeditions were carried out to 
hunt down fugitive slaves who had taken refuge in the woods, and the wars of 
extermination against those populations who resisted the conquest of their land were 
essentially manhunts (Hadden, 2003, 18, 50, 184; Steinfeld, 1991, 44; Chamayou, 2012, 
30-1, 72; Gott, 2012, 124, 480-1). 
    Concerning the continent described by Marx as a preserve for the commercial 
hunting of black, Jean and John Comaroff write that warfare in South Africa took the 
form of nocturnal ambushes, ‘shading into raiding’. Just as ‘combat and commerce were 
closely interconnected, [so] too were warfare and the hunt, between which there was a 
strong metaphorical and material identity’. The war-hunt was a foray beyond the safe 
confines of the polity and territory and yielded significant proceeds in terms of goods, 
resources and labour (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, 164). The British Commander 
charged with defeating the Xhosa in Cape Colony, Colonel Graham, spoke of ‘depriving 
them [the Xhosa] of the means of subsistence … for which the whole colonial military 
force is constantly employed in destroying prodigious quantities of Indian corn and 
millet’ and of ‘taking from them the few cattle which they conceal in the woods’. But he 
spoke also of having to ‘hunt them like wild beasts’ (cited in Gott, 2012, 178) in order to 
achieve the goal.  
    Taking all this into account, it is no exaggeration to say that capital’s conquest in 
the West was founded on a vast manhunt that continued across the Continents for almost 
four centuries: the hunting of blacks in Africa, the hunting of ‘Indians’ in the Americas 
and the East and West Indies, and the hunting of the poor across Europe. Capitalist 
accumulation was secured through the manhunt. As such, it simultaneously generated 
and engaged in whole series of related hunts, such as the hunt for pirates, the lynch-mob, 
the pogrom and the witch-hunt.  
    ‘The witch-hunt rarely appears in the history of the proletariat’, notes Silvia 
Federici, but such hunts took place where the war of enclosures was most intense and 
then exported to the American colonies as a police measure. As a strategy designed to 
‘instill terror, destroy collective resistance, silence entire communities, and turn their 
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members against each other’, the witch-hunt was also a strategy of enclosure: ‘class war 
carried out by other means’. Federici’s point is that the witch-hunt, which reaches its peak 
between 1580 and 1630, needs to be understood in terms of the process of primitive 
accumulation, a simultaneous pacification of women to parallel the pacification of the 
working class (Federici, 2004, 163, 176, 220). 
    ‘The police is a hunting institution’, notes Grégoire Chamayou (2012, 89), ‘the 
state’s arm for pursuit, entrusted by it with tracking, arresting, and imprisoning’. One can 
see this in the various technologies of police which have become so central to modern 
police forces: the police dog (Neocleous, 2011b), the psychological profile, the 
fingerprints, the photographs, the police helicopter, and now the drone as a technology 
for ‘unmanning the manhunt’ (Wall, this volume; Chamayou, 2011; Neocleous, 2013). 
But the tracking, arresting, and imprisoning are all traceable to the very origins of 
capitalist accumulation and the centrality of the hunt to those origins. We might say that 
the manhunt was nothing less than a core police power in the pacification of the 
proletariat as well as the accumulation of capital. 
    Pacification, it should be noted, enters political discourse in the late-sixteenth 
century, denoting ‘a process or operation (usually a military operation) designed to secure 
the peaceful cooperation of a population or an area where one’s enemies are thought to be 
active’ (Oxford English Dictionary). The OED also proposes that to pacify is ‘to reduce to 
peaceful submission’. In taking from the Roman tradition of imperial glory through 
military domination, in which pax implied ‘pacification’, ‘pacification’ was understood in 
terms of the verb ‘pacificate’, now obsolete but which in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries meant ‘to make peace’; the OED entry for ‘peace-keeper’ notes the emergence of 
the term in the very late-sixteenth century and ‘peacemaker’ just a little earlier. Playing on 
the constitution of internal order, ‘pacification’ quickly came to describe the creation of a 
certain kind of peace, order and security. Pacification, then, is a military act dressed up as 
the ‘peace’ of civil society. It was at the very same point historically that the category 
‘police’ (‘Policey’, ‘Policei’, ‘Polizei’) became central to political thought, denoting the 
legislative and administrative regulation of the internal life of a community to promote 
general welfare and the condition of good order. Within this frame of good order, the key 
function of police was ‘keeping the peace’. As Max Weber puts it, ‘the increasing demand 
of a society accustomed to absolute pacification for order and protection (“police”)’ was a 
key driving force in the direction of the bureaucratic state and capitalist accumulation 
(Weber, 1978, 972). 
    Thus we might say that the invention of capitalism saw the invention of the police 
dream of society. The creation of the ‘well-ordered police state’ (Raeff, 1983) was a 
process of pacification. Capital and police dream of pacification: a dream of workers 
available for work, present and correct, their papers in order, their minds and bodies 
docile, and a dream of accumulation thereby secure from resistance, rebellion or revolt. 
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    Yet there is more to be said, for as much as hunting is a police power so hunting is 
also a practice of war, as our discussion of the colonies has already suggested.5 Historians 
of war have tended to identify three principal forms of land war: the pitched battle, the 
siege, and the raid. Our conceptions of medieval and early modern war tend to rely 
heavily on the idea of siege and our conceptions of modern war tend to rely heavily on 
the idea of a pitched battle, but both have a tendency to minimise the predominance of 
the raid in the history of warfare, as recent scholarship has shown. ‘The most lethal and 
common form of warfare was the raid’, notes Azar Gat (2006, 117). The raid, however, 
has historically taken the form of the manhunt (Whitman, 2012, 28), which is why 
Aristotle (1996, 19) describes war as a form of hunting: a hunt for human rather than 
animal prey.6 ‘Most warfare was at base a form of the hunt for human prey’, notes James 
Whitman (2012, 35). ‘When we survey the history of human warfare with a careful 
professional eye’, he adds, what we overwhelmingly discover is ‘not heroic confrontations 
between armed warriors in a “fateful day” of pitched battle but the brutal hunt for human 
prey, in which armed men turn their weapons on defenseless members of their own 
species’ (2012, 26). ‘The war pack originally emerged from the hunting pack’, notes 
Canetti (2003, 192),7 a process that amounts to guerrilla war: a radical dissymmetry in the 
weapons, a form of fighting which consists less of pitched battles and much more of a 
process of tracking down and raiding. This war as hunting and hunting as war took on a 
capitalist hue when the rising bourgeois class and its state powers applied it to the 
tracking down of the vagrant non-worker.  
    Capital’s secret, then, lies in its ability to martial all the power the state can muster 
– manifesting itself variously as war power, as law power, as police power – in response to 
its own demand ‘Let there be workers!’, right down to its willingness to hunt down the 
labour it wants. Paraphrasing Aristotle’s claim that ‘the art of acquiring slaves … [is] a 
                                                 
5  In their account of capital and the ‘war machine’ Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 395) deny this, claiming 
that ‘it is certain … that war does not derive from the hunt’. Yet they make this claim solely on the 
conception of the hunt as a relation between man and animal, thereby completely overlooking the hunt as 
the relation between man and man and thus as a class relation. 
6  It is worth noting the remarkable historical loop undertaken by the concept of ‘raid’. The original 
meaning of ‘raid’ is ‘a military expedition on horseback; a hostile and predatory incursion, properly of 
mounted men’. The word appears to have died out by the seventeenth century, but was revived again in the 
nineteenth century by when the horses had disappeared from the picture and the term refers to an ‘invading 
troop or company’. In the twentieth century, the development of air power saw ‘raid’ connote ‘an aircraft 
on a bombing operation’, thereby giving us the concept of the ‘air-raid’ and, from there, given the role of air 
power as police power (Neocleous, 2013), it gets transformed into the ‘police-raid’. And note that the ‘dawn 
raid’, so beloved by police because it targets people when they are least aware and active, is also Stock 
Exchange slang for an early morning operation to buy a substantial number of shares in a company, thereby 
cutting out the opportunities for competitors in the commercial war. In the concept of the ‘raid’, in other 
words, we find once again the nexus of ideas at the heart of pacification: war-police-accumulation. 
7  The comment centres on a discussion of Canetti’s arguments regarding the pack in Crowds and Power. 
19
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 9 (2) Winter 2013  
 
species of hunting or war’, we might say that the art of producing wage slaves is a species 
of hunting or class war. This is not just about the actual hunt, though it is certainly that, 
but is also very much about the modes of classification, lines of demarcation and 
processes of administration drawn within the bourgeois order by the ruling class in order 
to define who might be hunted (Chamayou, 2012, 2). And the question of ‘who might be 
hunted?’ always needs to be placed alongside another question: what are the obstacles to 
further accumulation? To end, we might explore this a little in the context of the ‘security 
issue’ of our time. 
 
Let There Be Accumulation!  
 
 ‘I have … ordered that the full resources of the Federal Government go to help the 
victims and their families and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to 
find those folks who committed this act’. Thus spoke President George Bush on 11 
September, 2001. Later that day and on the following day he was at pains to call the 
attacks on the World Trade Center an act of war, but one which required a response in 
the form of a hunt. ‘Make no mistake: The United States will hunt down and punish those 
responsible for these cowardly acts’ (Bush, 2001a; 2001b). Two years later, as the war on 
terror shifted to Iraq, Bush commented that ‘all I know is we’re on the hunt [for Hussein]. 
It’s like if you had asked me right before we got his sons how close we were to get his 
sons, I’d say I don’t know, but we’re on the hunt’ (2003a; 2005a). This wasn’t just about 
Hussein, but was part of the nature of the war-police operation: ‘We’re at war in a 
different kind of war. It’s a war that requires us to be on an international manhunt’. Bush 
could not stop himself: ‘We’re on the hunt’ he insists again, elaborating further on other 
occasions by describing a ‘global manhunt for terrorist killers’ and ‘an unrelenting 
international manhunt’ (Bush, 2003b; Bush 2004a; Bush, 2004b). Zarqawi was talked 
about in the same language when he became the focus: ‘Zarqawi understands that 
coalition and Iraqi troops are on a constant hunt for him as well’ (Bush, 2005a).  
   Such formulations have been understood as part of Bush’s inheritance of the 
standard Republican trope of the gunslinger and the ubiquity in the US of the image of 
social order taken from the Western, and there is of course some truth in this. ‘Welcome 
to Injun country’, is said to be the comment made by soldiers serving in Afghanistan and 
Iraq on meeting new arrivals there, exactly the same phrase as was used in Vietnam. ‘The 
red-Indian metaphor is one with which a liberal policy nomenklatura may be 
uncomfortable’, notes Robert Kaplan, ‘but Army and Marine field officers have embraced 
it because it captures perfectly the combat challenge of the early 21st century’ (Kaplan, 
2004). Hence the hunt for key individuals replicates the hunt for key Indians: the hunt for 
Bin Laden was codenamed ‘Geronimo’. Beyond the individuals, the metaphor remains 
pervasive in American military discourse because it ‘suggest[s] chaotic and dangerous 
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territories that must be pacified, war against non-white peoples, guerrilla and terrorist 
forms of combat, and ultimate victory’ (Porter, 2009, 44). Most of all, however, the 
metaphor refers back to earlier colonial wars and thus reveals the permanence of the 
process of primitive accumulation. 
    In this regard we need to treat the hunting of Bin Laden and Hussein as just one 
aspect of a much larger hunting operation. This took the form of a hunt for terrorists in 
general, which in turn folded into a hunt for an amorphous enemy: ‘we hunt an enemy 
that hides in shadows and caves’; ‘we are on the hunt for the enemy, capturing and killing 
the terrorists before they strike ... we’re on the hunt for the enemy, and we’re not going to 
rest until they’ve been defeated’; and on it went (Bush, 2001c; 2006; 2005b). This hunting 
took place not only in Iraq and Pakistan, but was also part of the domestic scene as it 
coincided with, played off and reinforced an even wider hunt for criminals. Three times 
in the space of three months in 2004 President Bush commented on the importance of 
law and police powers as mechanisms for hunting the criminal-enemy as well as the 
terrorist-enemy. ‘The PATRIOT Act … allows Federal law enforcement to better share 
information to track terrorists, to disrupt their cells, and to seize their assets … If these 
methods are good for hunting criminals, they are even more important for hunting 
terrorists’ (Bush, 2004c; 2004d; 2004e). This was also understood as part of a wider ‘Call 
to Hunt for Terrorists’ in which the broader citizen body was to be mobilized (Murphy, 
2005). 
    This broadening out of the hunt suggests wider issues at stake beyond the trope of 
the gun-slinging law-enforcing sheriff. For a start, such hunting has come to dominate 
the scene of sovereign power in America. ‘How do we organize the Department of 
Defense for manhunts?’ asked Donald Rumsfeld (cited in Scarborough, 2004, 20), and 
within the US military and security elite the idea was taken seriously. One report written 
by two army Majors and an air force Captain noted that ‘the fundamental question 
concerning manhunting is whether the United States government (USG) is properly 
organized to conduct manhunts? Currently, the USG has no central organization that 
oversees manhunting’ (Marks, Meer and Nilson, 2005, 75). George A. Crawford, an 
intelligence and security officer with over 20 years experience at high level, developed an 
argument in a report from within the Joint Special Operations University and a 
paperback book concerning ‘the viability of manhunting as a core element of American 
national security doctrine’ (Crawford, 2008, 282; Crawford, 2009, 1, 7, 9, 34-40). A 
further document treats the manhunt as a link between Special Operations Forces and 
law enforcement agencies, arguing that ‘both SOF and law enforcement have interests in 
finding people’, that ‘the notion of manhunting has considerable merit’ for both war and 
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police, and that ‘for both SOF and LEAs … the characteristics of manhunting are 
basically the same’ (Alexander, 2010, 58-60).8 
    The arguments of Crawford and others situate contemporary security strategy 
within the long history of warfare and/as the manhunt. But then might we not do the 
same, only situating contemporary security strategy within the long history of class 
warfare? What is noticeable about the contemporary manhunt is that the wider this hunt 
gets – from named individuals, to terrorists in general, to criminals, to the enemies of 
order and security – the more it opens up the space for us to consider the war on terror 
through the logic of pacification. This renders it less a manhunt in the form of the 
Western and more a manhunt in the classical sense of war-police-accumulation; less a 
war on and hunt for those responsible for terrorist acts, and more war of and hunt for 
global accumulation. For although capital no longer hunts for workers in quite the same 
way as it once did during its early formation, it still demands ‘Let there be accumulation!’, 
and still uses all the means of violence at its disposal to meet this demand. In historico-
political terms, then, the hunt for Hussein in 2003 and his capture in December of that 
year was of far less significance than a whole raft of other measures within which the 
hunting needs to be positioned. Take, for example, the revision of Iraq’s patent law 
enacted just a few months after the hunt and capture of Hussein. 
    For generations, farmers in Iraq operated in an essentially unregulated, informal 
seed supply system, whereby farm-saved seed and the free innovation with and exchange 
of planting materials among farming communities was standard agricultural practice. Yet 
the Coalition Provisional Authority established after the invasion of Iraq changed the law 
(with Order 81), making it illegal for Iraqi farmers to re-use seeds harvested from new 
varieties registered under the law. As the GRAIN organization noted in an opinion piece 
on the war being waged against Iraqi farmers, ‘the purpose of the law is to facilitate the 
establishment of a new seed market in Iraq, where transnational corporations can sell 
their seeds, genetically modified or not, which farmers would have to purchase afresh 
every single cropping season’. In other words, the historical prohibition of private 
ownership of biological resources was to be replaced by a new patent law allowing a 
system of monopoly rights over seeds, with the rights in question almost certain to be 
held by multi-national corporations (GRAIN, 2004, 1-2). This was then supported and 
sustained by the broader measures entrenched in the new constitution established for the 
country in October 2005, which requires that the state in Iraq manages the Iraqi economy 
in accordance with modern – that is, ‘liberal’ – economic principles and to ensure the 
development of the private sector. Such changes demand that we read the ‘war on terror’ 
                                                 
8  With ‘live’ police hunts becoming regular features on TV, the manhunt also now offers another moment 
of the spectacle of security, reinforcing points made elsewhere in this volume by McMichael, Saborio and 
Wall. 
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through the wider frame of neoliberal strategy: what is important is the hunt for 
accumulation, not the hunt for Saddam. 
    From an anti-security perspective, what is most telling about the war on terror is 
not the ousting of dictators or the violation of liberty and law in the name of security and 
order, but the pacification of peoples, and this pacification takes place first and foremost 
through the separation of workers from the resources for anything like an alternative 
mode of being beyond capital. Remaining for the moment with the means of subsistence 
(or as the security-mongers like to call it, ‘food security’), the generation of a new seed 
market in Iraq must be situated in the context of TRIPS (Trade-Related aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights). Operating under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organization but pushed through by major corporations within the multi-national 
information industries and their lobbying group the Intellectual Property Committee, 
TRIPS enacts an ideology of intellectual property rights which presupposes that ideas and 
genetic material are commodities like any other, to be marketed as such and managed by 
monopolies through patent and copyright law. Resources once used by peoples on a 
collective basis become appropriated as property for accumulation, from the Indian neem 
plant now patented for oral hygiene use to the West African karité butter now 
appropriated by the cosmetics industry. For this process to work the legal status of the 
resources have to be changed from being the common property of indigenous 
communities to being the patented property of corporations; the ‘intellectual commons’ 
becomes private property, human need overridden by accumulation and profit.  
    This stress on intellectual property has become central to contemporary 
accumulation strategies, and this centrality is the reason why the figure once so widely 
feared and hated by the bourgeois class during the rise of capitalism, the pirate, has once 
more come to the fore. To put that another way, this is why piracy-hunting is once again 
all the rage. Because TRIPS is centrally concerned with intellectual property, it moves 
very quickly and easily between the patenting of certain products as medicine to the 
question of ‘pirated’ products under copyright. In so doing, the geopolitical problem of 
securing an accumulation regime increasingly reliant on intellectual property becomes 
bound up with the overwhelming hegemonic power of the concern with ‘terrorism’. 
Hence the contemporary line, now seen in government documents and journalism 
everywhere, that ‘Piracy is Terrorism’.9 Although such claims often refer to activities 
taking place in Somalia and elsewhere, and reinforce the idea that some states are outside 
the international legal order (viz., ‘pirate states’), it is remarkable how frequently the 
claims also refer to the importance of intellectual property for accumulation in general. 
    The equivalence between piracy and terrorism gained legitimacy in 1995, when 
New York’s Joint Terrorism Taskforce claimed that profits from counterfeit T-shirt sales 
                                                 
9  A quick internet search for this phrase offers over 6 million hits. 
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helped fund the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre. But following 9/11 a wide 
range of organizations have naturalized the relationship between piracy and terrorism, 
and in September 2003 Interpol extended its list of organizations seen as security threats 
and suspected of using profits from pirated material. Chechen separatists and Northern 
Irish paramilitaries were added to a list which already included Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, 
Hamas, FARC, Albanian and Basque separatists, anti-Arroyo agitators in the Philippines, 
and the Cosa Nostra. As a consequence, the widespread assumption is that profits from 
pirated films and games funnel back to organizations which supposedly threaten our 
security (Govil, 2004, 380). A conference on ‘Security Measures for Music’ – the title 
being somewhat revealing of our times: even music is now a security issue – held by the 
Indian Music Industry in Chennai in 2003, was informed by a former police 
commissioner that music pirates in Europe, the US and Pakistan have strong links with 
terrorist organisations, and that rooting out music piracy was a means of countering 
terrorism. Thus we are told, for example, that pirated films sold in Canada help fund the 
LTTE and that pirated games sold in the UK help fund Al Qaeda (Rangaraj, 2003). The 
general story runs as follows:  
 
They [the terrorists, the pirates] run what looks like legitimate businesses, 
travel to ‘business meetings’ in Frankfurt, Amsterdam, and New York, and 
pay fictional ‘employees’ with money that feeds and houses terrorist cells. 
They run computer manufacturing plants and noodle shops, sell ‘designer 
clothes’ and ‘bargain basement’ CDs. They invest, pay taxes, give to 
charity, and fly like trapeze artists between one international venture and 
another. The end game, however, is not to buy a bigger house or send the 
kids to an Ivy League school - it’s to blow up a building, to hijack a jet, to 
release a plague, and to kill thousands of innocent civilians’ (US Dept. of 
Transportation, 2003).  
 
In the political imagination of the security state, the crime of piracy is apparently so 
profound that it is not close to terrorism, but actually is terrorism, in that it constitutes an 
attack on accumulation itself. The hunt for the terrorist is thus always already the hunt 
for the pirate, and vice versa, but what is once again obvious is that what is really at stake 
in such hunting is never this or that pirate but, rather, the pirate in general and thus 
accumulation in general: ‘suffer pirates, and the commerce of the world must cease’ 
(Newton, 1742, 2). 
    This process has therefore unsurprisingly been called the ‘new enclosures’ or the 
‘second enclosure movement’, and is one of the reasons why there has been a resurgence 
of interest in ‘primitive accumulation’ as a category. Just as historical development of the 
‘old’ or ‘first’ enclosures was crucial to accumulation and pacification, so the ‘new’ or 
‘second’ enclosures reminds us of the fundamental role that intellectual property 
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currently plays in international accumulation and thus of capital’s constant demand: Let 
there be Accumulation! TRIPS thus needs to be set alongside other international 
arrangements such as NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), which 
allows the dumping of heavily subsidized food products by US-based corporations onto 
the markets of other countries within the Agreement. In Mexico alone this has led to the 
ripping from producers of an estimated $1 billion a year in earnings and to the forcible 
dispossession of some 2 million farmers of their means of subsistence (and who, as 
migrants, thereby become a ‘security problem’ and who therefore have to be hunted 
down).  
    The pirate has always been interpellated as communis hostis omnium – ‘the enemy 
of all mankind’ – and the hunt for the pirate thereby easily legitimized. But the hunt for 
the pirate, as a criminal-enemy, and thus as a threat to both internal security and global 
order, has involved powers used in prosecuting both belligerents and criminals (Simpson, 
2007; Heller-Roazen, 2009). The pirate, in other words, must be made to succumb to the 
war power and the police power. As we have seen, the exercise of such powers in the 
name of capital and to realise the demand for accumulation is the process of pacification. 
    The great secret of pacification is thus the very secret Marx reveals about capital: 
that wage labour must exist, must be constant and must be regular. In other words, if the 
point of pacification historically was the use of political and legal power to manufacture 
wage-labour as the grounds of accumulation, this remains the case today. From the 
perspective of a politics of anti-security, the violent dispossession and proletarianization 
of peoples in the name of intellectual property rights and manifested through the hunt for 
the criminal-terrorist-pirate is the contemporary instantiation of systematic pacification. 
For both capital and the state, the hunting will never end. 
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